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Over the last two to three decades the world has seen a virtual revolution in the way in 
which the death penalty is practiced and perceived. In 1977, only 16 countries had 
abolished the death penalty for all crimes.1 By the end of 1988, 35 countries had 
eliminated the death penalty altogether. 2 Today, more than two-thirds of the countries 
in the world have abolished the death penalty in law or practice, and among the 58 
remaining death-penalty countries, only 18 were known to have carried out 
executions in 2009.3  Although the Chinese death penalty numbers are still regarded 
as “state secrets”, there is no doubt that China alone executes many more individuals 
than the rest of the world combined. Unofficial Chinese reports counted an average of 
15,000 executions per year between 1997 and 2001, 4  and an estimated 5,000 
executions in 2009, still more than all other countries combined. 5 
 
In terms of public opinion, there has been a worldwide revolution over the last ten to 
twenty years. When President Mitterand stood for election in France in 1981 on a 
manifesto that included abolishment of the death penalty, 63% of the population 
supported its use. Today, the figures stand at only 45%, with only 14% who “strongly 
favour” the death penalty in France, and 31% who are “somewhat in favour”.6 The 
European Union was declared “death penalty free” in 1998, and the practice is now 
banned within its borders.7 Only the United Kingdom, with a 50% support rate, defies 
the picture of Western Europe. It is the only country without a majority public opinion 
against the death penalty. In Australia, opinion has swung even more dramatically, 
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from 53% support of capital punishment in 1995, to a mere 23% support in 2009.8 In 
contrast, a large death penalty survey done by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences fifteen years ago, in 1995, showed that 99% of the Chinese population 
supported the death penalty, the highest rate of support in the world.  
 
When we focus on the majority trend in the world today, the recent rapid change in 
opinions runs counter to former taken-for-granted assumptions of punitive norms in 
general. Until recently, it was argued that people’s attitudes towards punishment 
represent a core element of culture, that people’s punitive attitudes are an important 
cultural point of reference. A much used textbook explanation was that, quote: “we 
learn to react punitively… just as we learn to speak a language”9 In other words, this 
statement asserts that punitive norms are strong markers of culture and stick to us in 
much the same way as our language does. But it will be seen tonight that punitive 
norms in fact fluctuate much more readily and are much less culturally rooted than the 
learning of a native language.  
 
Notably, the Chinese government and many Chinese intellectuals share in the 
assumption that there are deep cultural roots in Chinese death penalty sentiments. 
China’s Premier Wen Jiabao has claimed that China would not abolish the death 
penalty due to “consideration of China’s national conditions”.10 In a recent anthology 
on the uses of the death penalty in China, Professor Gao Mingxuan argues similarly 
that execution is based in what he sees as a Chinese retributive culture. Gao goes on 
to argue that the consequences of such deeply rooted punitive preferences is that 
“China will not abolish the death penalty at present or in the near future”.11 Again and 
again, in Chinese journals and books we hear the argument that China has a “5000 
year old tradition of death penalty”, and that this accounts for why China today 
adheres to the practice. One may ask, is there any country that doesn’t look back at a 
heritage of thousands of years of “death penalty traditions”?   
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Of course there is a tradition of retributive “penal populism”, in China as elsewhere, 
where people believe in the alleged effectiveness of harsh punishment.12 And yes, 
there are popular traditions of revenge in China.13 Of course, there are always cultural 
links to violence, as in the occasional uprisings in history by poor peasants seeking 
vengeance for harm visited upon them. Elizabeth Perry has noted that certain policies 
of the state under Mao Zedong contributed to the survival and strengthening of 
traditional patterns of violent activity.14 The early Communist Party had seen the 
death penalty as a cruel practice, and on June 15th, 1922, the Communist Party 
formally suggested that the death penalty should be abandoned.15 But Mao saw the 
notion of people’s revenge as a political tool. He declared that the death penalty – 
although it should be “used with caution” – must be effectively utilized against “the 
worst local tyrants and evil gentry” in order to strengthen the class-consciousness of 
the masses.16 Mao advocated that the people should have the right to take revenge 
against their exploiters. He refuted the argument that peasants had “gone too far”, and 
supported the killing of landlords, claiming that “it is necessary to create terror for a 
while in every rural area” to be able to fight the rule of the landlords.17 Mao saw 
execution as justified on the grounds of retribution to “assuage the people’s anger”.18 
The Maoist argument about appeasing the people’s anger seems to have developed 
into a basic legal principle that still lingers on, legitimising state violence and capital 
punishment.  
 
In a survey of legal personnel in China conducted in 2007, 90% of the respondents 
answered that the principle of minfen (vengeance) continued to play a role in the use 
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of the death penalty. Only two per cent thought the aspect of “people’s anger” had no 
impact at all. 19 The paradox here is that a society that claims to work for the aim of 
creating a “harmonious society” (hexie shuhui 和谐社会) is based on such basic 
principles of revenge.   
 
Chinese scholars have picked up on this paradox. Professor Lu Jianping opposes the 
practice of killing in the name of popular opinion and indignation. It is clear, says Lu 
with characteristic understatement, that: “killing is not the best way to make people 
live a better life”. Well aware of the practices of (now fading) public executions and 
public sentencing rallies (shenpan dahui 审判大会), Lu addresses the dark sides of 
collective behaviour, noting that “(people’s) rationality could be reduced in a public 
event”, and that in some cases, a “square effect” (guangchang xiaoying 广场效应) 
may occur, and people may just become bewitched and follow others’ instructions; a 
fact that can be very well demonstrated by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution”.20   
 
Let us go back to Professor Chen Xingliang’s argument about revenge. Although he 
supports a limited use of the death penalty, he argues against the principle of minfen 
or people’s anger. He basically maintains that the anti-crime “hard strike” (yanda 严
打) campaigns that started in 1983 brutalized the justice system because “we believed 
too much in the deterrence of punishment, and because the emphasis was given to the 
masses’ feelings of retribution.” 21 These feelings of retribution, or the masses’ 
“revenge psychology” (baoying xinli 报应心理) has had the unfortunate effect, 
according to Chen, of increasing resentment and hatred (yuanhen 怨恨) among the 
victims’ families, and potentially vast numbers of people in society. He continues: 
“We abused the death penalty, and we accumulated hatred and grievances in society 
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saving life from the law), in Chen Zexian, Sixing – Zhongwai meizhu de jiaodian (Death penalty – The 
global focus), Zhongguo gong’an daxue chubanshe, Beijing 2005, p. 75 (pp. 71-85) 
(shehui jiyuan 社会积怨)”.22 The point about accumulated social hatred is very 
important. The basic argument he uses, and could have used more thoroughly because 
it concerns the death penalty as such and not its degree only, is that the death penalty 
sends an example of revenge that is disruptive to the very argument and management 
of a “harmonious society” Chen touches on the very important theme of the 
escalating character of revenge based principles and hatred. Lu’s and Chen’s 
warnings are well founded. It has been pointed out by scholars in the field of revenge 
and retribution that revenge seems always to tend towards excess and “escalating 
cycles of violence”, where we are “likely to lose control” rather than stay in control; 
that the appetite for blood is hard to stop when such principles are set in motion.23 
Without going into those details here, we have seen clear examples of minfen 
targeting the government in China lately.24 Lu’s “square effect” of escalating violence 
is supported by the general literature on revenge. While Lu emphasizes that public 
opinion is not only backwards, but can be “advanced” as well,25 Chen Xingliang adds 
to his “revenge psychology” argument that the relative value of human life is not high 
in China, and that this is a main argument that the time has not yet come to abolish the 
death penalty in China.26 Qiu Xinglong, the most consequent informed abolitionist in 
Chinese legal circles, opposes this argument. Agreeing that the value of life has been 
and is still low in China due to a lack of a strong “humanitarian concern” (renwen 
guanhuai 人文关怀), he turns the argument against the elites when he goes on to say 
that this is mainly due to a general and persistent lack of respect for human life among 
Chinese scholars (xuezhe 学者) and the elite as such.27 He further claims that his 
colleagues lack academic independence and professional integrity. If the scholarly 
community keeps sticking to the dogma that the death penalty could only be abolished 
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25 Lu Jianping, “Sixing shiyong yu minyi”, p. 78. 
26 Chen Xingliang, Xingfa linian daodu, Beijing, Falü chubanshe, 2003. 
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some time in the future, but is needed for the current socio-political conditions as 
claimed by Chen, the death penalty will never be abolished.28 We will come back to 
Lu and Qiu’s arguments with concrete survey evidence later. Yuan Bin is right when 
he sees the public opinion as extremely changeable and unstable, “manageable or 
malleable” (keyi yindao de 可以引导的).29  
 
Despite Chen Xingliang’s keen observation of the principles of the escalating violent 
character of revenge, one has to question his very premise of Chinese death penalty 
core culture based on an all embracing popular “revenge psychology”. In particular 
we have to address this question when it is being used to legitimize the continued use 
of the death penalty in China. 
   Is there a strong popular tradition of people’s revenge in China by way of 
executions?  Professor Qu Xuewu at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 
Beijing doubts the cultural argument of a “5000 year long tradition”.30  Qu coins the 
term Chinese “multi-culture” (文化的多元性  wenhua de duoyuan xing) of 
alternatives to death penalty practices. He notes that Chinese popular culture did not 
exclusively go by the principles of  “paying back a life with a life” (sharen 
changming 杀人偿 命) or “blood debt” (xiezhai  血债).  
 
For instance, Chinese national minorities instead of practicing “blood debt” used the 
principle of “life debt” (命债 mingzhai) through the practice of monetary “life 
compensation”, so-called peimingjia (赔命价), where the murderer had to compensate 
the family for the killing of their family member.31 The issue was solved without 
killing the perpetrator. We know such practices from many pre-industrial societies, 
not only in China. J.A. Barnes claims that: “the ethnographic evidence shows that, in 
general, primitive societies are not characterized by repressive laws” and that “it is 
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governmental action that is typically repressive”. 32  The cultural explanation of 
“people’s revenge” is secondary, the governmental practices of the dynastic, 
bureaucratic machine were primary. The death penalty was always primarily political, 
not cultural. Today, a culture of popular violence has become the pretext for the state 
to explain and justify the uses of the death penalty. 
 
What about Imperial Chinese history? When we look at the practices of the imperial 
state, there are no reasons to believe that it was punitive compared to practices in 
other parts of the world. Historically, China has experienced the brutal legal elite 
philosophy of the ancient Legalist school (fajia 法家), but this was tempered by the 
approach of the Confucian school (rujia 儒家). The Legalists forcefully advocated 
harsh punishment without mercy, whereas Confucian scholars emphasized virtue (de 
德), benevolence (ren 仁) and mercy (renci 仁慈). No doubt the Legalist paradigm 
has left a lasting legacy of a brutalizing State, but on the whole we cannot find that 
Chinese history has been more brutal than let us say European history. And let me 
warn against the concept of “the West” here. In terms of punitive practices and 
opinions, Europe and America are strikingly different. James Whitman has argued 
that these differences between Europe and America are due to fundamentally different 
traditions in legal institutions and thinking.33  
 
In short, the state’s need for control helps to explain the use of capital punishment, but 
the state can also show mercy, and that tradition was as strong or stronger in China 
than it was in Europe, where the concept of mercy also played a role.  
The presence of systems of mercy, argues James Whitman, made Europe less punitive 
than America.34 Mercy instead of revenge comes de haut en bas – from up and down.  
In some fundamental way, it seems, one has to have the social distinction of high and 
low to be able to grant mercy to subordinates.  Mercy is first and foremost a matter of 
power, and paradoxically only power seems to be able to grant mercy. Only a strong 
state could deliver that mercy. Through the French revolution the more lenient 
punishment used for the upper classes was granted to the common man. One of the 
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and Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2003. 
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lasting effects of the revolution was, in other words, a more lenient punishment 
regime. In America egalitarianism came in another form, and I would call it “violent 
egalitarianism”. Here, it seems, what was granted to the common man was that a lord 
should be treated in the same way as a horse thief – they were both hung without 
mercy. Europe became and stayed far less punitive than America.  
 
Is the lack of legal mercy the reason why China developed such a strong culture of 
revenge and harshness? China did have a strong state, and it did have status 
hierarchies the way Whitman described in the case of Germany and France. Did 
China not develop the institutions of mercy necessary for developing the historical 
trend of mildness in punishment? The answer is that China historically possessed all 
the ingredients expected to promote leniency and a milder system of justice. The same 
status hierarchies were found there as in Europe, lenient punishment for the elite was 
developed through the bayi (八议) system, 35 and a system of legal mercy based on an 
established status-hierarchy was more developed in China than in any other part of the 
world. Feudal rule was of course always harsh, but China displayed more mercy that 
Europe. General amnesties and acts of grace or mercy were granted more frequently 
in China than anywhere else. Brian McKnight has translated the Chinese expression 
she (赦) as “acts of grace” or “amnesty”.36 The most extensive forms of mercy were 
called dashe (大赦), “great acts of grace”. These general amnesties applied to the 
whole empire and were conducted with much ritual pomp and circumstance. While 
ordinary amnesties merely reduced penalties, the great acts of mercy forgave the 
offenders entirely. Here it will be enough to point to the existence of an extremely 
strong Chinese culture of mercy to establish the argument of a legal history favouring 
milder punishment rather than harsher sanctions. From the founding of the Jin dynasty 
in 280 A.D. to the fall of the Tang dynasty in 907, a great act of mercy was issued on 
the average of once every eighteen months. The remarkable system of legal mercy 
reached its peak during the Song dynasty (960-1279). Executions were reduced 
extensively by the use of this system. Even during the last and brutal Qing dynasty 
executions were often suspended, and the system of legal mercy did not disappear 
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before the empire disappeared in 1911. This is not to say that the imperial order was 
not an extremely harsh order, but all the ingredients for a more lenient system existed 
in China even more than they did in Europe. China is one of the few civilizations (and 
India is included among them) where the death penalty was abolished in feudal times. 
From 747-759 AD the Tang dynasty abolished the practice because of the Legalists 
forcefully advocated harsh punishment without mercy the emperor’s strong regard for 
human life.37 During other dynasties there were decades where no execution was 
carried out.  Klaus Mühlhahn sums up the essence of penal history in imperial China:  
 
“(E)xecutions in late imperial China were no match for the ferocious events staged in 
eighteenth-century Europe”. He concludes: “The punishments carried out in imperial 
China were largely reversible and relatively bloodless, marked by the intention to 
carefully refine and graduate the use of state violence”. 38 
 
Public opinion surveys and the modern reality of rapid change  
 
The assumption of an age-old unchangeable revenge culture does not fit the picture of 
rapid change that is occurring in China and the rest of the world today. Let us go back 
to where we started, to the massive change in capital punishment practices and 
opinions throughout the world over the last few decades. The change in global death 
penalty attitudes and policies is one of the most rapid and unlikely norm reversals of 
our time. The picture is complex, but the most prominent change has been what is 
termed the “innocence frame”. The fact that people were innocently convicted and 
executed, the discovery of forensics, the use of DNA evidence; all of this diverted 
attention away from theoretical and philosophical issues of morality to focus instead 
on the possibility of errors in the criminal justice system. A “tipping point” has been 
reached in the death penalty debate where changes in public opinion has led to further 
changes in policy, which in turn reinforce those same changes in public opinion.39  
 
In sociology, scholars like Mark Granovetter have explained how norms can change 
suddenly and in spectacular fashion. Granovetter talks about “threshold models of 
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collective behaviour”, and explains how a critical number of opinion holders can 
suddenly challenge a “mainstream” opinion.40 The journalist Malcolm Gladwell 
explains the potential rapidity of normative change through the term “tipping point”, 
“threshold”, or boiling point” where rapid normative change occurs.41 Such processes 
have proven to be self-reinforcing. Policies and practices that have been stable for 
decades, reinforced by an established way of thinking of a problem, can change 
suddenly and dramatically when new dimensions arise. The mainstream anti-smoking 
norm burst into what public opinion research calls a “social cascade” of norm change. 
Studies on social cascades have recently focused on how information disseminates 
through social links in online social networks.42 The Internet in China has created a 
“blogosphere” of great importance for the spread of information and rapid opinion 
change. The point to be emphasized here is that sociology contradicts the Chinese 
allegation of slow cultural change in a range of areas.  Penal norms in general and 
death penalty norms in particular are not necessarily core cultural norms, learnt like a 
language, hard to change. The death penalty norm has changed dramatically world-
wide in only a decade or so. We have to look at how the death penalty debate is being 
publicly framed. What is new is what has been called the “innocence frame”. An 
“innocence movement” developed in Europe and America among academics and 
activists in the late 1980s and has exploded into the main frame of death penalty 
debates today.43 The former “deterrence frame” has been severely weakened. Gone 
are the days of 1975 when Isaac Ehrlich, an economics professor, went to congress 
with “evidence” that one execution could save at least eight future victims.44 Such 
arguments are thoroughly dead and buried since then, and the methodology used by 
Ehrlich has since been condemned as flawed and unscientific by the mainstream 
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scholarly community.45 Instead, the framing of the debate is now focusing on an issue 
of system fallibility, seeping into even the closely controlled Chinese blogosphere.  
 
The innocence frame has affected American sentencing practices. The number of 
executions has gone down substantially over the last ten years. When attitudes are tied 
to core values, however, new information does not seem to produce substantial 
attitude change.46 Without being pressed for specifics, people tap into their core 
values. The reason for the slower change in America than in Europe is historical, but 
is explained by the fact that most Americans’ views on the death penalty are closely 
linked to their religious sentiments. In China, the claim that punishment opinions are 
based on cultural core values seems to lack substantial evidence other than in the form 
of anecdotal examples. The support for sayings like “kill the chicken to scare the 
monkey” (sha ji jing hou 杀鸡儆猴) or “scare one to warn a hundred” (sha yi jing bai 
杀一儆百) are still mere anecdotes of popular retribution, not evidence of a serious 
core culture of retribution, definitely not evidence for capital punishment support.  
Like any society that comes out of a rural and authoritarian past, there will be support 
for such practices, but this does not lead us to understand today’s death penalty 
opinions. If we look at the most recent opinion data from China, we find evidence that 
death penalty attitudes are all but core values. In the recent representative survey done 
by the Max Planck Institute in cooperation with Wuhan University only 25% of all 
respondents were concerned by the issue of death penalty. Many respondents 
answered: “don’t know” or “not sure” to the different questions asked.47 48 When the 
public does not really pay attention to the death penalty question, this may function as 
a conservative element against change. At the same time, low salience opens up large 
possibilities for change; it certainly does not show the “strong cultural roots” of 
                                                
45 The controversy over Ehrlich's work was so important that the National Research Council convened 
a blue ribbon panel of experts to review it. The panel decided that the problem was not just with 
Ehrlich's model, but with the idea of using of econometric methods to resolve controversies over 
criminal justice policies. See a short presentation of the debate in Ted Goertzel, “Myths of Murder and 
Multiple Regression”, The Skeptical Inquirer, Volume 26, No 1, January/February 2002, pp. 19-23. 
46 Alvarez, R. Michael, John Brehm, Hard Choices, Easy Answers: Values, Information, and American 
Public Opinion, Priceton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 2002. 
 
47 Oberwittler, Dietrich, Shenghui Qi, “Public Opinion on the Death Penalty in China. Results from a 
General Population Survey Conducted in Three Provinces in 2007/08”, Max Planck Institute for 
Foreign and International Criminal Law.  April 2010 
http://www.mpice.de/shared/data/pdf/forschung_aktuell.41.pdf 
48 Frank R.Baumgartner, Suzanna L. De Boef, Albert E.Boydstun, The Decline of the Death Penalty 
and the Discovery of Innocence, p. 182. 
punitive attitudes among Chinese people as claimed by the culturalist argument. 
Instead of reflecting core values, this evidence points in the direction of disinterest or 
confusion, a situation that is highly susceptible to change.  
 
The Survey Evidence 
 
Not until very recently has the degree of support for capital punishment in China been 
scientifically documented and/or empirically verified properly by research. This is not 
to say that we have not had interesting data to work with, but only recently has the 
survey data based on cooperation between the Max Planck Institute and Chinese 
researchers been able to present a cutting-edge representative survey on capital 
punishment in China. The survey was conducted in three provinces (Hubei, 
Guangdong, and Beijing) during 2007 and 2008, and the data was released recently. 
Parallel to this survey, the University of Wuhan has conducted a survey among legal 
professionals using a very similar questionnaire.49 At the same time we have data 
from the big survey made by the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing in 1995.50 In 
addition, a string of other surveys of greater or lesser importance and methodological 
stringency has been made available to us over the last decade or so.51 
 
We know that survey results can be dramatically altered by the methodology used, the 
way in which questions are phrased, and even by the questioning sequence used.52 
The most common question used in capital punishment surveys asks respondents if 
they favour the death penalty “in the case of murder”. As I noted before, it will be 
easy to support the death penalty in the abstract – in response to a survey question – 
even if one would be equally easily influenced by the possibility of errors in particular 
cases. The innocence argument is closely related to the shift from thinking of the issue 
in the abstract to considering a concrete decision about a particular individual.  This 
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shift may not be fully reflected in most public opinion surveys, but becomes evident 
when a question brings a specific case involving execution to the attention of the 
respondent.53 
 
Let us then look at the survey data, and start with that particular question. Normally, 
public opinion surveys have a lower percentage answering they are for capital 
punishment in the case of murder than for capital punishment in general. In America, 
58% still supported the death penalty in general in 2012 (the lowest support in 40 
years), while only 49% supported the death penalty for murder.54 We find this pattern 
in other societies as well. The strange result found in China is that 78% uttered 
support for the death penalty in cases of murder, but that the answer to the general 
question of support for the death penalty only gave a 59% support in favour, much 
lower support than in the United States. Whatever the explanation of this finding is, in 
comparison with the 99.2% support found in 1995, this is a very dramatic 
development. The “death penalty for murder” group answers “don’t know” or “not 
sure” on the general question, but in the general survey the abolitionist stand has 
increased from 0.8% in 1995 to 14% in the recent survey. The debate on reducing the 
death penalty, however, seems to have made a massive change in opinion. In a Public 
Security survey from 1992 as many as 60% thought punishments were “too lenient” 
and only two per cent thought the draconian death penalty regime was “too strict”.55 
In the 1995 survey this number had increased marginally to just over three per cent 
who thought the death penalty “too strict”, including the 0.8% who wanted the death 
penalty abolished.  
 
In a 2008-09 survey a lot of groups in China had majority opinions against or 
restrictive of the death penalty.56 Among the 1131 students in the survey, nearly 85% 
wanted to reduce or abolish capital punishment. There was also a majority support for 
abolishment among jobless people. Most notably, 726 inmates in prisons or reform 
through labour institutions were surveyed, and 91% of them wanted to abolish or 
reduce the use of the death penalty. In short, the concrete situation a respondent finds 
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himself or herself in explains the attitude toward the death penalty, not an alleged 
popular “core culture”. One third of the inmates wanted the death penalty abolished, 
not because they were on death row, but because they had seen the injustices in the 
system at close range. This is called situational norms rather than cultural core norms. 
 
Another piece of evidence that the moralist core argument does not work well is the 
growing awareness of the class bias of capital punishment. Asked the question: “If a 
poor or a rich person in China committed the same serious crime for which the death 
sentence could be imposed, is one more likely to be sentenced to death than the other 
in real life?”, nearly 70% of the respondents answered “the poor person”.57 The 
significance here is that the common man in China has begun to see the flaws of the 
judicial system. We know from scattered data that the jobless and the poor are victims 
of capital punishment in China, like anywhere else. Jeffrey Reiman’s famous line: 
“The rich get richer and the poor get prison” also applies to China, even if we 
substitute “prison” with “death penalty”.58  In a survey of executions where the 
offenders’ occupation was known, it was found that 62% were either unemployed or 
rural residents. Nearly 70% held a low status job. The vast number of Chinese 
executed for common street crimes had low status occupations or held no jobs.59 The 
sudden doubt in the justice provided by the system, the questions about fallibility and 
unjust treatment, the accurate description of class bias of capital punishment despite 
the secrecy of numbers, represent exactly the core of the “innocence frame” that has 
changed public opinion in so many countries recently. Through the media, and in 
particular through the Internet, the Chinese public has become aware of the fact that 
people are innocently sentenced to death because of sloppy procedures, unjust 
treatment, and a corrupt non-caring justice system. Let us look at a few recent cases 
that have caught the public’s eye. 
 
In 2005 the Ministry of Public Security ordered court authorities to reopen a rape-
murder case where a new suspect was caught ten years after 21-year-old Nie Shubin 
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was executed for the crime. Nie Shubin was convicted of murder and rape in 
Shijiazhuang in 1994 and was executed after Hebei's Higher People’s Court upheld a 
lower court’s ruling to sentence him to death in April 1995.60 Similarly, a butcher in 
Mayang County in Central China's Hunan Province, was wrongfully convicted and 
executed for a crime he did not commit. A local woman’s dismembered body was 
found floating in a river. The authorities investigating the crime claimed at a trial that 
the murderer must have been someone experienced with a knife – someone like a 
butcher – because the techniques used to dissect the body were “very professional”.61 
But after the execution, the woman he was supposed to have murdered suddenly 
reappeared alive. In another well publicized case, a man was sentenced to death with 
a two-year reprieve in 2000, but his alleged victim, presumed dead for 11 years, 
turned up at his home earlier this year.62 Such cases have begun to appear on Internet 
blogs fairly regularly. In another recent example netizens took an interest in the case 
where a Henan citizen named Zhao was released from prison thanks to the 
reappearance of the neighbour he supposedly murdered more than a decade ago.63  
 
The Max Planck survey of China addresses the issue of innocence for the first time in 
China. The findings confirm very well the potential for change in this country. Asked 
the theoretical question whether innocent people might be wrongly executed, 60% 
agreed, while only 26% of the respondents disagreed.64 Of even greater interest is the 
answer to the concrete question if you would still support the death penalty if there 
were evidence of executions of innocent persons within the judicial system. As many 
as 44% of the undecided and pro-death penalty respondents would oppose the death 
penalty if proof was found that innocent people had been executed. 31% were still 
undecided, and only 25% would still support the death penalty.65 This is a level of 
support lower than in the United Kingdom today. Since the innocence debate is yet to 
dominate the Chinese media, this is remarkable. Elasticity and change is the picture 
here, not that of a retributive core culture. We find similar evidence of the potential 
for rapid change in non-representative surveys. In a survey among 2000 persons in 
China in 2002, 82% supported the death penalty, while 14 per cent said they wanted it 
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abolished.66 When the question was changed, and rephrased on the assumption that 
the death penalty had already been abolished by the state, only 60 per cent wanted to 
retain the death penalty, while the number of abolitionists had increased to 33 per cent. 
This reflects what we already know from death penalty opinion research in other 
countries, that if the state passes legislation banning the use of the death penalty, as a 
rule public opinion will follow suit. For our purposes here it is enough to conclude 
that there are no fixed and culturally strong incentives that force Chinese opinion to 
routinely support the death penalty.67  
 
At this stage more has to been said about opinion change. In many ways, public 
opinion surveys are fairly conservative since they tend to focus on individuals. When 
we study individuals, we often see constancy, but when we study aggregates, a new 
picture of orderly change appears. Some people are fairly constant in their opinions. 
These are the people with strong core values, political, often religious, and in 
particular fundamentalist values. America and Poland are countries where core values 
about capital punishment are linked to a literalist religious belief. Let us put such 
respondents in the core value group. Opinion follows a flat line of stability in groups 
like this. A small proportion of the public, however, moves systematically in response 
to the environment and new information. In the death penalty debate in America or 
Europe, these people were the ones who turned to the innocence frame. In the 
literature such groups represent systematic change – the signal – that will appear 
clearer only over time. This signal group can influence the climate of opinions in a 
remarkably short period of time. Another group can be termed the ambivalent group 
that fluctuates between the core value group and the signal group. This group is 
caught between the two other groups, but we can see the trend of change in the way in 
which this group leans towards one or the other part of the spectrum. The important 
group to target to see change in the making is the signal group, but also through its 
impact on the ambivalent group. If the signal group is the instigator of change, the 
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ambivalent group are their immediate followers, they tell about the direction of 
general opinion change.68  
 
In the Max Planck survey, this group who often answered “don’t know” and “not 
sure” to the questions asked tended to be fairly large on a lot of the questions asked. 
On the main question: “In general, do you favour or oppose the use of the death 
penalty?” 58% were “in favour” of the death penalty, 14% were “opposed”, and 28% 
were “not sure”.69 Some people might argue that these people have no clue at all, but 
this is untrue. It is important to look at where the ambivalent group is moving. In the 
Chinese death penalty debate we see this group moving towards the signal group, the 
abolitionist minority.  The undecided group may not say yes or no to the use of the 
death penalty in general, but we still have a clear profile of this group. This is vividly 
illustrated in the graph showing attitudes towards the perceived efficiency of the death 
penalty in terms of deterrence. When asked about whether the death penalty is an 
effective way to prevent crime, the following preferences were shown in the Max 
Planck survey in the following table: 70   
_
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Look at the ambivalent group of “undecided” respondents. In the figure we see 
graphically a group leaning towards the same profile as the signal group who oppose 
the death penalty. Deterrence is still a major issue in death penalty opinions in China. 
Those who are undecided lean towards scepticism, and the largest group within this 
group of undecided regards the deterrence effect as “very low”. In short, a lot of the 
undecided respondents lean towards the opposing signal group, the abolitionists. We 
can find this trend in a lot of the survey questions. The profile of the ambivalent group 
of “don’t knows” suggests the future of opinion trends in China. The “don’t knows” 
in China, as in Europe in recent decades, are leaning towards the signal group of 
abolitionists. Even those not open to change at present will be affected by this trend in 
the long run if we believe aggregate opinion theory. The survey shows the flexibility 
and changeability of public opinion on the death penalty, contradicting the 
assumptions of hard-to-change penal norms and strong core culture of “revenge 
psychology” 
 
Let us focus again on the latter assumption, that the Chinese common man – the 
laobaixing (老百性) – is to blame for China’s use of the death penalty, that the 
people’s “anger” is preventing the abolition of the death penalty in China. It seems 
that the so-called Chinese masses are not the conservative “deeply rooted retributive” 
element holding back reforms. The survey data points, rather, in quite an opposite 
direction. Public opinion seems to have changed faster than legal institutions and the 
slogans of the government and Communist Party. Let us have a look at these data 
again. A 1995 survey conducted by the Academy of Social sciences found that by 
using rather confusing categories of “high class” and “low class” that “high class” 
respondents were less likely to support the death penalty than respondents from the 
“low class” category. There were very few in both categories in 1995 who chose 
abolishment or reduction of the death penalty, but the highest and the lowest class 
category chose this option more often than the middle class categories.71 If we look at 
the different job categories, however, we find the absolute highest support for capital 
punishment among military personnel, where 43% responded that there was “too 
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little” of it in 1995. There was a long jump down to the second most punitive group, 
retired officials, where 28% were of this opinion. Personnel in the legal sector where 
the most liberal among the elites in the 1995 survey. Only nine per cent believed there 
was “too little” use of the death penalty. Young people under 25 were the most likely 
group to support abolishment, and those over 61 were most conservative of the age 
cohorts, with the fewest number of abolitionists.72 Women were slightly less punitive 
than men,73  and the allegedly revengeful people, the category called “masses” 
(qunzhong 群众), saw twice as many ticking off the questionnaire for abolition or 
reduction of capital punishment compared to the category “central Party cadres” 
(zhonggong dangyuan 中共党员). While only 20% of the “masses” wanted more 
capital punishment in 1995, 30% of central Party cadres wanted more of it.74 If the 
idea is leading by example to overcome the things of the past, then certainly the Party 
cadres are not standing in the front lines to educate the masses. The same can be said 
about intellectuals. The survey showed that illiterates and those with primary school 
education were twice as likely to support abolishment or reduction than respondents 
with “university” education. The higher the education, the higher was also the 
percentage in the most pro-death category of answers. Close to 30% of those with the 
highest education wanted more capital punishment, while only 20% of illiterates and 
respondents with primary school education were that punitive. In sum, the strongest 
support for the death penalty was found among military personnel, party cadres, those 
with the highest education, and the elderly. The lowest support was found among 
those with the least education, the category called the “masses”, and those under 25 
years of age. The only elite groups contradicting the trend towards elite support for 
the death penalty were legal elites and the richest cohort. Among the legal elites there 
were few abolitionists, but much more support for reducing the death penalty. High-
income respondents’ fear of capital punishment for corruption or economic crime 
made them liberal confronted with a poorly regulated financial market where the 
distinction between entrepreneurialism and corruption is not always clear. These facts 
muddle somewhat the categories “high class” and “low class” in the survey, and leave 
the findings in that general category somewhat irrelevant. 
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Today we have three excellent representative surveys, covering the attitudes of the 
general population as well as the legal elites. The most liberal group of intellectuals in 
the 1996 Academy of Social Sciences survey, the legal elite, and the common people 
can be compared in much detail through these surveys. A 2005 survey found that as 
many as 88.4 per cent of the legal elites supported the death penalty.75 Only 57.8 per 
cent in the public survey, however, supported the death penalty. While 7.5 per cent of 
the legal elites wanted to abolish the death penalty immediately, 14 per cent of the 
general survey respondents held this opinion. Furthermore, 28 per cent of the general 
population were unsure what position to take compared with 21 per cent of the legal 
elites.76  
 
The conclusion we can draw from this table comparing the general population and 
most liberal of the elites, the legal elite, is that the alleged “backward” group of 
common people is actually more liberal on the death penalty question than any of the 
elite groups. The argument here is not that of “deeply rooted revenge psychology” of 
the masses or a general “penal populism” in China. We rather see clear survey 
evidence of a “penal elitism”. The death penalty is a political instrument held aloft not 
by a 5000 year-old “culture”, but by the State and its elites. This is a political, not a 
cultural issue, and involves a conservative, too slow moving state and Party 
bureaucracy. In terms of the secrecy of the numbers executed in China, the general 
public is also more advanced than the Party and State elite. Asked whether the 
Chinese government should publish the annual number of executions, 64% answered 
yes, and less than 16% were against publishing the execution figures.77 
 
In conclusion, we can say that public opinion in China is moving faster than the 
system itself. The only thing that seems “deeply rooted” in the Chinese death penalty 
debate is the deeply rooted myth of a general retributive and revengeful opinion 
standing in the way of legal reducing or abolishing the death penalty. The penal norm, 
as we have seen, is far from the old mainstream assumption that “we learn to react 
punitively… just as we learn to speak a language”, a matter of hard-to-change core 
culture. On the contrary, the penal norm in China is not part of a never changing, 
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deeply rooted core-culture. It is changing rapidly and substantially. The new 
innocence frame is one of the driving forces in the change we have seen on a global 
scale for some years already. This frame is beginning to establish itself also in China. 
John Kingdon has quoted Victor Hugo in trying to understand the power of framing. 
Hugo once said: “Greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has 
come”.78 The innocence frame is clearly an idea whose time has come, and death 
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